Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2018

Between Economic Planning and Market Competition:
Institutional Law and Economics in the US
Laura Phillips Sawyer
Associate Professor University of Georgia School of Law, LPhillipsSawyer@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Laura Phillips Sawyer, Between Economic Planning and Market Competition: Institutional Law and
Economics in the US (2018),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1367

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @
University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited
from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Between Economic Planning and Market
Competition: Institutional Law
and Economics in the US
Laura Phillips Sawyer

In 1926 John Maurice Clark published a seminal text in institutionalist economics, Social Control of Business, surveying the ways in which
business was subject to control by a variety of formal and informal
constraints.1 The text rejected mainstream ideas in neoclassical political economy by explaining how individual self-interest and competition
could be manipulated not only through legal rules but also by custom,
habit, codes of ethics, and morals. Representative of the institutionalist
movement, Clark discarded presumptions of an individualistic economy
based on market competition. Instead, he posited that long-term public
goals of prosperity and equity could be achieved through the public and
private study of “industry itself,” which existed “on the frontier where
new policies are being worked out.”2 The book fused the development
of the regulatory state, giving particular attention to administrative law,
with self-regulation by businesses and trade associations. Both public

L. Phillips Sawyer (*)
Harvard Business School, Boston, USA
e-mail: LSawyer@hbs.edu
© The Author(s) 2018
R. Fredona and S.A. Reinert (eds.), New Perspectives on the History
of Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58247-4_12

349

350   L. Phillips Sawyer

and private regulations, he argued, advanced codes of conduct to standardize business activities and control competitive practices. Building on
the work of Richard Ely, John Commons, and Dean Roscoe Pound,
Clark’s Social Control of Business extended progressive liberals’ initiatives
for regulatory state expansion through administrative agencies and it
advanced private rulemaking by trade associations as a complement to
the development of mandatory public regulation.
Social Control of Business epitomized the first great law and economics
movement’s challenge to the neoclassical paradigm of academic research
and public policy.3 Rather than pursuing a policy agenda based on a
singular model of human behavior or industrial order, the institutionalists believed that social science research should guide policy makers in
shaping rules and regulations according to the particular structure of a
given industry. The purpose of industry-specific studies was twofold: to
understand the economic dynamics of an industry, giving especial attention to social costs or negative externalities, and to construct a detailed
account of the macroeconomy as a whole. That approach resulted in a
slew of studies and policies that many critics have said amounted to little more than questioning of orthodox economics, rather than a coherent research agenda. Institutional economics, in turn, has been largely
dismissed and overlooked by mainstream economic and policy history
because of its limited duration in the academy and its very diverse policy prescriptions.4 Dismissing the influence of institutionalism obscures
the intellectual origins and social purposes of the 1920s “new economics” in academic research, regulatory policy, and private self-regulation.
This essay argues that one of the central tenets of institutionalist law
and economics—the social control of business—helped structure the
research and planning agendas of administrative agencies, such as the
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
as well as private research organizations, including Harvard Business
School (HBS), the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).5 The motivation
toward social control united progressive liberal economists who sought
to reform not only academic research methods but also policy-making
outcomes. Their experiences during WWI with domestic economic
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planning motivated the institutionalists toward postwar collaboration
with government officials, regulators, and private research institutes.
By the mid-1920s, the first great law and economics movement had
embedded a long-term research agenda within both public administrative agencies and private research institutes, both of which pursued
social science research in economic planning.
***

Interwar Institutional Economics
At the close of the First World War, the American Economic
Association (AEA) convened a small, one-day conference to discuss
various aspects of postwar recovery. Sessions covered monetary stability, maintenance of international peace, price fixing during peacetime,
and the future of agricultural policies.6 At that conference, Walton
Hamilton coined the term “institutionalist economics” to signal a break
with existing US economic thought and policy. In turn, Hamilton
emerged as the initial spokesperson for a group of progressive liberal
economists who believed neoclassical economics, theory, and regulation could not address the new economic realities of the postwar world.
Cosponsored by the American Sociological Society, his panel, entitled
“Economic Theory,” stood apart from the rest. At that panel, Walton
Hamilton laid out a new agenda not only for economic theory and
research methods but also for economic regulation.7
Hamilton’s paper, which appeared in the following year’s American
Economic Review, surveyed the state of the discipline and argued that
neoclassical economics’ reliance on subjective value theory had led
the discipline away from critical analysis and toward becoming nothing more than status quo apologists.8 “Only in recent years has value
theory escaped a formal association with laissez faire [but] now even
its most positive statements bear in such terms as ‘utility’ and ‘productivity’ and in the wording of principles [belie] implications about the
worthwhileness of prevailing arrangements.”9 Neoclassical economics
was not wholly laissez faire, Hamilton conceded; however, the subjective
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theory of value relied upon the premise of free competition and individual choice that Hamilton questioned. The world had changed with
industrialization and world war, Hamilton and many other progressive
economists argued, bringing new social problems and greater demand
for control of powerful economic interests. Institutional economics, he
offered as an alternative, was “concerned with industry in relation to
human well-being.”10
Economics had taken for granted the institutions—derived from
custom, habit, and formal legal structures—that ordered economic
relationships. Hamilton argued that because “institutions are social
arrangements capable of change rather than obstinate natural phenomena,” economics “should be relevant to the modern problem of control.”11 Whereas neoclassical economists’ focus on value theory had
been “derived from the classical doctrine of organization of industry
[based] upon the principles of free competition,” the institutionalist
research agenda began not with the presumption of perfect competition
but rather focused on the inherent malleability of economic relationships.12 Rather than seeking out “economics statics” and equilibria to
explain the “immutable” laws of industrial economies, Hamilton envisioned administrative agencies and private initiatives capable of identifying the “economic dynamics” that created and distributed value.
Partnership between business, government, and the social sciences could
temper competition and improve the distribution of wealth. Those
new administrative bodies could collaborate with firms and trade associations so as to gather information and help shape business interactions through “conscious control.” The purpose of the “social control”
of business would be to improve not only efficiencies but also, perhaps
more importantly, the distribution of wealth and resources.
For Hamilton, as with the institutionalist movement more generally,
not all market competition improved social welfare or maximized efficiencies. In response, his life’s work was dedicated to the pursuit of
economic models and legal reforms that employed new management
techniques for a public purpose. Others in this movement—including
Wesley Claire Mitchell, Sumner Slichter, Leo Wiloman, Dexter Keezer,
Stacy May, and Morris Copeland—were also concerned with the
responsibilities of business to society.13 Their great insight was that
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neoclassical economics had failed to incorporate ethical or societal considerations into its economic models, instead presuming that free competition necessarily maximized aggregate welfare.
Several leading institutional economists pioneered studies in business
cycles, investigating the causes of economic booms and busts as well as
the social costs of economic adjustments. Wesley Mitchell, who developed the most influential theory of business cycles in 1913, provided
a trenchant critique of neoclassical value theory and its presumption of
rational decision making.14 Borrowing from Thorstein Veblen’s criticism
of mainstream economics’ portrayal of man as a “lightning calculator of
pleasure and pain,” Mitchell argued that such a hedonistic conception
of man failed to consider the psychological or evolutionary influences
on decision making.15 Rather than fixing prices according to market
supply and demand, for example, businesspeople could be driven to
“ruinous competition,” wherein prices fall below costs, by their desire
to destroy rivals. Not only could such behavior reduce competition and
facilitate market consolidation, it also increased unemployment, drove
down wages, and facilitated underconsumption.16 Mitchell also examined banks’ pro-cyclical lending, businesses’ over-leveraging during a
boom, and the concomitant bankruptcies characteristic of an economic
bust or recession. Mitchell’s work on business cycles and prescriptions
for macroeconomic “social experiments” to mitigate downturns proved
influential during the brief but sharp postwar recession.
Clark’s Social Control of Business built upon Mitchell’s study of business cycles by emphasizing that private rights alone could not satisfy the
needs of a complex industrial society. Rather than individuals guiding
business decisions, Clark presented six case studies that examined formal industrial regulations, extralegal codes of ethics used by business
and professional associations, and informal union rules. In his final
chapter, “If I were Dictator,” he reflected on how those overlapping
rules and mechanisms might be employed to negate the negative externalities of industrial production, including waste of natural resources,
unemployment, and underconsumption. Critically, however, Clark
believed that the administrative state must partner with business, professional, and labor organizations rather than dictate state-led or topdown regulations. He intended that partnership to preserve the positive
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benefits of the price mechanism, while also guiding closer coordination
between business and government.17
The institutionalists appealed to the wider world of progressive
reform and political discourse. Despite their critics, they developed several programs for the collection, tabulation, and dissemination of business statistics by appealing to reformers, business groups, and regulators.
First, they built on the progressive liberal tradition emerging at the turn
of the century that emphasized the interdependencies created by modern industrialization and urbanization. The institutionalists came from
a cohort of pragmatic social reformers, such as John Dewey, Herbert
Croly, and Walter Lippmann, who supported the expansion of state
power to better citizens’ lives. Institutionalists built on those impulses
and contributed a technocratic vision of expert-led governance through
administrative state agencies and trade associations. Secondly, the institutionalists also appealed to a diverse set of businesspeople seeking to
rationalize business management practices—sometimes through topdown regulation but more often through deliberative organizations
outside of government. Finally, their empirical approach attracted the
attention of both business associations and state agencies, creating new
collaborations between academic economists, private commercial associations, and government regulators.18
In their rejection of universal principles and generalizable economic
rules, the institutionalists preferred deductive logic, which required
industry-specific studies to evaluate the changing processes of price and
wage setting, patterns of employment, and procedures to manage competitive markets. In order to paint “a picture of the pragmatic reality
called industry,” they pursued present business statistics as well as historical data in search of social and economic trends.19 Then as now, the
great strength and purpose of the institutionalists’ research agenda also
became its Achilles’ heel. The main critique against the institutionalists was their lack of a coherent research method or any generalizable
theory of value or competition.20 But, of course, this was precisely their
point—neither economic conditions nor their governing institutions
remained static, and the purpose of the social sciences should be to
understand how those institutional constraints could be used to govern
dynamic economies.
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Social Control and the Administrative State
The institutionalists’ critique of neoclassical economics and law reflected
a pervasive reconsideration of market competition that had resulted
from the economic realities of a changing industrial order. Prior to
the wartime experience of a coordinated market economy, formal legal
rules and administrative agencies had been created to manage a rapidly
changing economy. Corporate consolidations around the turn of the
century had been met with the consternation of farmers, small proprietors, and laborers who felt disenfranchised from the economic gains
made by corporate capitalists. Those social dislocations that accompanied industrialization and urbanization informed the regulatory politics
of the anti-monopoly movement, which feared not only the consolidation of market power suppressing competitive markets but also the corresponding malady of undue political influence corrupting democratic
political processes. In turn, the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890 forbade restraints of trade and monopolization in interstate
commerce. Yet, it failed to stem the growth of large-scale corporations or abuses of dominant firm position, such as predatory pricing.
Additionally, the US Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the law
occluded any associational activities that could be construed as collusive and, thereby, the Court further incentivized vertical consolidation.
The institutionalists provided economic reasoning for a political and
regulatory movement to further revise the rules of competition through
administrative experts, rather than legislative processes. They endorsed
new administrative controls intended to manage competitive processes
so as to reduce social costs and market externalities associated with these
corporate consolidations and market fluctuations.
Although the passage of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
Clayton Acts of 1914 failed to settle the uncertainty of competition
policy, these did empower an administrative agency to review and prosecute anticompetitive business activities. That legislation created the
FTC, which prohibited price discrimination, tying contracts, interlocking directorates, and unfair methods of competition, and also exempted
labor unions from antitrust prosecution. President Wilson, who signed
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the act, asked the US Chamber of Commerce (USCC) to participate in
an experiment with the FTC to “match all the facts of business throughout the country and to see the vast and consistent pattern of it,” just
as the Department of Agriculture did for farmers.21 Joseph Davies,
Commissioner of Corporations at the Department of Commerce,
explained that the purpose of the FTC was “to convert the anarchy of
unlicensed competition into a condition under law of competitive liberty, which will preserve those seeds of individual initiative and enterprise.”22 The liberal democratic goals espoused by the FTC mirrored the
nascent formation of institutionalist research and policy agendas.
During its first years, FTC commissioners promoted uniform cost
accounting and information sharing on industrial trade statistics in
efforts to promote standardized business practices largely through trade
associations and minimal public oversight. FTC Commissioner Edward
Hurley, former president of the Illinois Manufacturers’ Association,
explained that reliable cost information must be the first step in rationalizing intra- and inter-business practices.23 In an FTC pamphlet circulated to 230,000 businesses and commercial associations, for example,
Hurley explained that rather than focusing only on sales volume, managers should determine the costs and revenues of each specific product line and distribute the overhead expenses accordingly. The manual
demonstrated bookkeeping methods to actuate product line expense
reports.24
Uniform cost accounting standardized methods to calculate prices
and, thereby, influenced what constituted a fair price according to both
the informal rules promulgated by trade associations and the standards enforced through FTC prosecutions. The notion of an enforceable standard of fair competition required basic bookkeeping before
the FTC could sufficiently regulate trade practices or act as a clearinghouse for industry information. Training “industrial secretaries” became
a focal point of USCC meetings. Paul Cherington, an economist
and marketing professor at the Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, as it was then known, led a special committee on retail
prices and cost accounting for the Chamber. For Cherington and other
progressive economists and businesspeople, unfair competition carried a
destructive edge that cut against independent proprietors. “Destructive”
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or “cutthroat” practices included secret rebates given to large-scale retailers, sales below cost, and loss leader advertising. These activities, they
argued, threatened the long-term viability of competitive markets for
quality consumer durables by reducing the number of competitors.25
Cherington, along with Paul Nystrom (a Wisconsin-educated economist),
embraced Brandeisian logic that valued a decentralized economic order
and endorsed antitrust exemptions for associations of small proprietors.
Although the institutionalists did not promote restrictions on firm
size or scope, they shared progressive liberals’ fears that concentrated
economic power might lead to predatory practices and monopoly.
Searching for a middle ground between conceding to oligopolies of
large firms and preserving inefficient firms, the institutionalists’ publicprivate regulatory approach to protecting competitive markets reflected
the policy preferences of Louis Brandeis, an architect of the FTC.
Those efforts to manage market competition through trade association
rulemaking that often bordered on collusive behavior also provoked the
ire of some dominant firms. For example, Percy Straus of Macy’s, a chain
department store based in New York, led efforts against Resale Price
Maintenance, a coordinating device used by small and independent proprietors to standardize brand name prices across all retail outlets.26
The administrative reordering of public and private interests
informed not only President Wilson’s stance on domestic competition
policy but also mobilization efforts during the First World War. Both
progressive economists and leading businesspeople participated in wartime planning efforts, many of whom became advocates for codes of fair
competition and greater collaboration between government and business to rationalize markets through standardized business practices and
information sharing. Yet, the wartime experience did not create a fully
institutionalized order. Initially, smaller businesses had begun efforts at
voluntary war preparedness, and later, Bernard Baruch, chairman of the
War Industries Board (WIB), led efforts for “cooperative committees of
industry.”27 The WIB did not authorize outright price fixing, although
military purchasing bureaus enforced price restrictions. It left an ambiguous legacy—it relied on the voluntary collaboration of trade associations and government regulators, creating neither a fully coordinated
nor a cartelized economy.
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The war’s legacy strengthened the appeal of public-private management of competitive industries as a viable model for American regulation and antitrust reform, especially for small and medium-sized
firms for whom corporate consolidations appeared most threatening.
The war’s celebrated legacy of the social control of business galvanized
both institutional economists and administrative regulators interested
in rationalizing business interactions to institute social and economic
reforms.28 But the FTC’s renewed attention to trade association activities and policing competitive business practices almost immediately
provoked a jurisdictional dispute with the Court, regarding which
branch of government could determine what constituted unfair trade
practices.29 Despite the Court’s ruling that narrowed the FTC’s authority, businesspeople within the USCC and regulators at the FTC and
Department of Commerce continued to pursue rulemaking authority
through administrative interventions.
The wartime experience strengthened the institutionalists’ research
agenda and broadened the appeal of private businesses partnering with
public administrative agencies as beneficial to both private concerns
and public interest. This confluence of factors helped to rework the
conceptual category of market competition. By the 1920s, a d
 istinctly
American view of “new economics” captured prominent economic
departments, business schools, government bureaus, and USCC
debates. Advocates envisioned a system of cooperative capitalism that
managed production and consumption so as to maintain price stability,
facilitate innovation, and ensure fair play among competitors.
Through the 1920s, this program for managing American competition became part of the administrative role of the Department
of Commerce and FTC. With Herbert Hoover at the helm of the
Department of Commerce, he took over many of the standardization,
conservation, and information-sharing efforts first initiated by the WIB
and carried these into peacetime. In his role as US Food Administrator
during the war, Hoover had led a team of businesspeople and economic
experts to coordinate production and distribution of foodstuffs abroad.
“Food will win the war,” he promised the USCC.30 Indeed the widespread success of wartime industry coordination helped popularize
the associational movement, not for price controls per se but certainly
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for the continuation of information sharing and standardization programs. In July of 1921, the Commerce Department began publishing
a monthly Survey of Current Business, a collection of industry statistics
on bids, prices, quantities sold, and orders. The Survey lent authority to
the “open price association” model, which had received support from
Louis Brandeis and Arthur Jerome Eddy a decade earlier as a method
by which trade associations might mitigate the so-called ruinous competition through mandatory information sharing.31 Similarly, Hoover
helped reform the Census Bureau to gather and disseminate economic statistics for both private businesses and public regulators. The
Government Printing Office published endless pamphlets and manuals
on cost accounting, industry standards and statistics, and business cycle
reports.32
Hoover’s influence reached beyond the Department of Commerce
as well, extending to the FTC and Department of Justice by mid-decade. Under his leadership, a series of government-sponsored conferences brought together businesspeople, public officials, and reformers
to address a range of business problems, including overfishing Alaskan
salmon, oil by-products in the Chesapeake Bay, and highway safety. By
the mid-1920s, the FTC began hosting industry-wide trade practice
conferences, building on the engineer’s conviction that standardized
practices could eliminate waste in production methods and employment fluctuations. These conferences were intended to rationalize business practices and set standards for what constituted fair competition.
Hoover’s close economic aide, Wesley Mitchell, urged the Commerce
Secretary to consider how these social costs of doing business were
transferred onto the public at large.33 Hoover’s interest in reducing waste and rationalizing industry coincided with Mitchell’s institutional agenda to reduce the costs of industry. Although Hoover did
not endorse direct economic interventions in most cases, he expanded
the federal government’s sphere of influence over business through
data collection, tabulation, and distribution. Moreover, as chairman
of President Harding’s Committee on Recent Economic Changes, he
adopted Mitchell’s language of “social experimentation” to alleviate
unemployment endemic to business cycle swings. Although Hoover
agreed that capriciousness of the market led to labor unrest and
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unemployment, transferring social costs from business to society, he
was not prepared to accept institutionalists’ proposed labor legislation.
Nevertheless, the fact-finding missions of the Committee on Recent
Economic Changes as well as the capacity building of administrative
agencies influenced the range of policy proposals available to President
Franklin Roosevelt’s first administration.
Despite his initial efforts, Hoover could not stifle Department
of Justice prosecutions of such loose combinations under Attorney
General Harry Daugherty’s leadership; however, Hoover did outlast
him. When Daugherty stepped down in April 1924, President Calvin
Coolidge nominated Harlan Fiske Stone to replace him. A friend of
Hoover and progressive economists alike, Stone, who would join the
Supreme Court only a year later, initiated test cases against trade associations in order to clarify what industry cooperation would pass constitutional muster. For example‚ Stone brought an antitrust suit against
the Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association for information sharing on production processes, bids, and output. Then, one year later,
as a newly appointed Court Justice, he penned the Court’s opinion
upholding the association agreements. The trade associations, according
to Stone’s majority opinion, had collaborated to reduce waste and had
also reduced prices, relative to nonmembers. Also, the Court held, the
association’s collaboration with the Department of Commerce provided
important information to the Federal Reserve and other departments of
government.34 Although the institutionalists had not formalized a theory of public-private management of competitive markets, a shift in the
American regulatory system had taken place by the mid-1920s.35

Academic Experts and Intermediary
Organizations
The attention given to Hoover’s Department of Commerce obscures
the role of a wide range of advocates in public service and private
research institutes who also fostered a public-private system of managed
competition.36 The popularity of institutionalist research methods and
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goals to rationalize internal management and stabilize inter-firm competition spread to leading research universities and institutes. Animated
by a belief in the responsibility of business to society and the possibility
for new forms of social control, a loosely coordinated movement arose
across a variety of newly established research organizations, including
Harvard Business School (HBS), the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER), and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC).
These private organizations pursued industry-specific studies to better understand competitive practices and the price-cost relationship
according to industry-specific production and distribution methods.
Studies focused on the methods used to coordinate industrial development through uniform cost accounting, standardized production
and grading systems, and codes of ethics affecting prices and wages.
Indeed, there was great hope that rationalizing intra-firm management
through research-based rules might stem business cycles, reduce waste,
and provide a more equitable system of competition, minimizing social
costs. These intra-firm management techniques were often codified
by trade associations and sanctioned by FTC regulators, particularly
when sponsored through FTC trade practice conferences. Ultimately,
these research centers helped establish organizational and professional
authority by disassociating such coordinating tactics with private selfinterest or cartelization. Instead, research and publicity supported
association-based cooperation as an alternative to both free market
competition and state socialism.
The Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration promised
a new era of business organization and managerial efficiency achieved
through expert accountants and managers, which it publicized to the
US Chamber of Commerce. For example, Paul Cherington explained,
the business school’s course “Commercial Organization” had developed
its “own system of uniform cost accounting,” which “trained recruits”
mastered in banking, railroad rate making, commercial law, and general accounting.37 Students attended discursive lectures by professors
and industry leaders and then performed fieldwork as an apprentice of
sorts. The scientific accounting methods of these “commercial secretaries” explained pricing policies and provided important legal defense for
price protection policies by a single firm or a group of firms. Instituting
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a uniform system of cost accounting became one of the most important
prerequisites to coordinating business group best practices.38
The Harvard Bureau of Business Research had been established
“for the purpose of assembling and classifying business data and
establishing … standards and principles of business action.” The school
employed the institutionalist research methods, and many of its early
leaders subscribed the movement’s progressive policy agenda.39 From its
outset, Dean Edwin Gay, a trained institutional economist, complained
that “no accounting and statistical standard existed” especially in retail
management, where competition between chain stores and independent
proprietors frequently drove prices below the latter’s costs. The political backlash provoked by highly competitive industries had encouraged
campaigns for protective legislation and a sincere questioning of
whether or not concentration and consolidation benefited consumers in
the long run.
Gay steered Harvard’s directors to conduct its first study in the retail
distribution of shoes. Given that industry’s relatively standardized and
stable production methods, retail management techniques could be
isolated and analyzed.40 The “Harvard System” developed a cooperative framework of information sharing—600 participating shoe retailers
from across the country submitted sales data to the Bureau’s statisticians, who created standard accounting methods and principles. They
measured each store’s gross profits, total operating expenses (excluding freight, cartage, and interest), buying expenses, sales force, advertising, deliveries, rent, interest, stockturns per year, and annual sales
of the average salesperson. The Bureau, then, calculated percentages for
each category and circulated comparative charts to show how the least
and most profitable businesses operated.41 The data showed how firm
management dictated prices and profitability. Additionally, the data
provided the requisite information to sufficiently identify predatory
practices, which associations might prohibit. Similarly, Edwin Gay later
partnered with the progressive liberal business leader, Henry Dennison,
to advance voluntary reforms to corporate governance in support of
profit-sharing plans and pension plans.42 Social science investigations
could be used to improve business management techniques as well as to
expose the social costs and benefits of competing systems.
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During the war, Mitchell had envisioned creating a nonpartisan institute to provide serviceable social science data for both public
and private management purposes; antitrust law, however, presented
an obstacle. It was not clear what information-sharing constituted
an attempt to restrain trade.43 Under Mitchell’s guidance, the
NBER partnered with the Department of Commerce and the FTC
for information gathering purposes. The accumulation and analysis
of such knowledge, Mitchell argued, required permanent public and
private institutions to support social science research and guide public
policies.44
That relationship with government continued after the war; at the
behest of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Mitchell received
an invitation to participate in President Warren Harding’s Conference
on Unemployment in 1921. Mitchell joined the business cycle committee, along with Owen Young (chairman, General Electric), Joseph
Defrees (president, Chamber of Commerce), Matthew Woll (American
Federation of Labor), Mary Van Kleeck (Russell Sage Foundation). To
avoid future economic recessions, the committee’s final report called for
greater information sharing between business and government for the
purpose of private and public planning.
The best service Government can render is to collect the necessary information to show us what the present situation in business is, what current
trends are, to collect comparatively simple statistics from a very wide circle of industries, to put it in effective form and then make use of it by the
business public.45

Mitchell, who had been a founding member of the institutional economics school, was perhaps one of the best experts to reach out to the
business community and explain the micro- and macroeconomic benefits of cooperative research, rulemaking, and economic planning. His
book, Business Cycles (1913), had famously explained economic downturns as the result of endogenous shocks that reverberated throughout
the economy.46 He had categorized the variables that determine profits, revenue, and costs, and he explained how each variable responded
to stages of a cycle. Mitchell’s study concluded that “during the revivals

364   L. Phillips Sawyer

prices of labor rise less than prices of commodities.”47 This wage lag created a problem of underconsumption that could retard recovery.
As a result of his academic work and participation on the conference committee, Mitchell supported “social experimentation” in private and public unemployment insurance programs to protect workers
during economic downturns.48 While not all conference participants
embraced unemployment relief and insurance plans, Mitchell urged
Hoover to embrace relief in order to achieve recovery. Hoover took
credit for creating unemployment branch offices in states with severe
unemployment; those offices then partnered with federal agencies.49
The conference recommendations reflected institutionalists’ concerns
with uncoordinated economic activities leading to problematic social
consequences, like unemployment and waste of natural resources,
which required government oversight and coordination of private sector business decisions. The final report also brought together multiple
disciplines to achieve macroeconomic stability, appealing to economists,
businessmen, statisticians, and social workers. Mitchell remained a part
of Hoover’s Commerce Department, acting as a lead economist to the
Advisory Committee on Statistics aiding in the Department’s Current
Survey.50
In addition to the NBER, several other private and university-based
research institutes emerged in this period. In 1923, Charles Merriam,
a professor of political science, established the Social Science Research
Council (SSRC) at the University of Chicago. The SSRC employed
similar empirical methods and, by the early 1930s, became influential in national political economy. Like Mitchell, Merriam rejected the
rational man theory of value in neoclassical economics. Instead, he pioneered quantitative studies on individual decision making that could
be aggregated in order to better understand how democracies think, so
to speak. He envisioned these data being particularly useful to political leaders and their social scientist advisors.51 Ultimately, he is credited with founding the behavioralist approach to the practice of politics,
which, similar to institutionalist economics, employed modern psychology and statistical research to understand individual choice and pluralist decision making. His goal with the SSRC and later organizations,
such as the Public Administration Clearing House, was to improve
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government administration through social science research so as to
achieve democratic ends, charting a path between free market capitalism and state socialism.52 Also like Mitchell, those goals brought him
back to federal government service, both within President Hoover’s
Research Committee on Social Trends, in 1929, and President Franklin
Roosevelt’s National Planning Board, in 1933.53
Each of these organizations brought the social sciences closer to business management and public policy making, though in distinct ways.
HBS sought to professionalize business management not only in the
pursuit of profits but also toward the public interest. NBER’s goal to
gather and disseminate micro- and macroeconomic data to mitigate
business cycles brought its economists in direct contact with both business leaders and policy makers. Likewise, the SSRC’s research agenda
focused on minimizing the social costs of American capitalism through
economic reforms aimed at raising social minima. Although each
attempted to retain its impartiality, the thin line between scientific
management and social economic planning blurred as social scientists
moved between groups, cross-pollinating ideas and institutions.
***
For institutionalists like Mitchell, Hamilton, and JM Clark, institutionalism affirmed that business was broadly “affected with a public interest.”54 Institutionalists also espoused a firm commitment to
deliberative processes, following their commitment to social scientific
inquiry, economic measurement, and fact-gathering.55 From that developed the managerial economics of pricing behavior of firms, macro
studies of business cycles, organizational theories of ownership and corporate governance, and public-private designs for competition policy.
The theme of social control runs throughout each of these categories of
inquiry. The idea of social control of business steered institutionalists to
develop government regulation toward socially desirable outcomes. This
diverse group chose different routes to that end. Hamilton, for example, joined the Yale Law School and focused his efforts on constitutional
arguments to abandon the legal formalism of yesteryear.56 He remained
firmly an antitruster who believed in the public-private tradition of
managed competition. He reentered government service as an assistant
attorney general to Thurman Arnold in 1938. Mitchell continued to
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gather data and direct research initiatives at the NBER and proposed
modest indicative planning.
The crisis of the Great Depression created a catalyst for social-political change in the USA, and under these circumstances policy makers,
regulators, and business leaders drew from existing paradigms of economic management. The influence of a more radical strand of institutionalists peaked during the First New Deal with the National
Industrial Recovery Act, but outright price fixing failed to pass constitutional muster. Nevertheless, institutional economics and the vision
of managed competition as a public-private exchange persisted through
piecemeal legislation in the Second New Deal. But it was the continued
authority of the FTC as the manager of competition, evolving through
administrative law rather than statutory mandate, which provided its
truly lasting legacy.57
Public-private cooperation between regulators and business groups—
for better or worse—has become embedded in American state-building.
In addition to various trade associations’ success at coordinating industry standards, information sharing on costs and prices, and intra-group
monitoring, businesspeople learned that greater political power and
legitimacy resulted from collaborating with academics and government
officials. But this was not a straightforward “capture” story.58 These
coalitions promulgated a vision for managed competition that must be
understood as resulting from that interwar cooperation. In other words,
we cannot understand the interest group story of managed competition
without appreciating how an alternative vision of American capitalism
resulted from an ongoing exchange between institutional economists,
public regulators, and private research institutes. We cannot understand
the complexity or contingency of US political economy without recognizing the plurality of visions for American capitalism that rejected
free market competition but yet did not embrace state socialism either.
Within these interstices, the institutionalists helped build the modern
American system of public and private economic governance.
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